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Abstract: 
Proponents of tax harmonization - especially in politics - often employ welfare-
economic arguments. Tax competition - they argue - leads to economic distortions 
which can be avoided when tax bases and tax rates are harmonized. And even 
more a competitive „race to the bottom“, which would erode the ﬁscal foundations 
of the modern welfare state, has to be prevented by tax harmonization. But how 
valid are these arguments? Is there really a clear-cut case in favor of tax harmo-
nization based on economic theory? In this paper we review the basic economics 
of international tax competition and analyze some of the popular arguments in 
favor of tax harmonization critically.
1. Introduction
Proponents of tax harmonization - especially in politics - often employ welfare-
economic arguments. Tax competition - it is said - leads to economic distortions 
which can be avoided when tax bases and tax rates are harmonized. And even 
more a competitive „race to the bottom“, which would erode the foundations of 
the modern welfare state, has to be prevented by tax harmonization. 
But how valid are these arguments? Is there really a clear-cut case in favor 
of tax harmonization in economic theory? 
In this paper we want to review the basic economics of international tax 
competition and analyze some popular arguments in favor of tax harmonizati-
on critically. We start with an evaluation of the dimensions of tax competition 
and deﬁne the scope of the paper (part 2). We identify international competition 
in taxes on capital income (like a tax on interest income) as currently most im-
portant dimension of tax competition and concentrate on a welfare-economic 
analysis. Part 3 applies the theory of optimal taxation and optimal government 
size to tax competition. In the fourth part of the paper we present, discuss and 
analyze several simple models of capital tax competition and tax harmonization. 
The ﬁfth part presents some empirics on the effects of international tax compe-
tition while the last part summarizes the ﬁndings and broadens the perspective 
by public choice considerations. 
We show that from a welfare-economic perspective the case is still largely 
undecided. Distortions occur under tax harmonization as well as under tax com-
petition, and empirical work indicates that the distortions of tax harmonization 
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might well be larger. Public choice arguments on the other hand promote tax 
competition almost unanimously. 
Based on these results we conclude that a comprehensive economic perspec-
tive, which takes public choice aspects into account, speaks in favor of tax com-
petition and not of tax harmonization.
2. Scope of the paper - a welfare-economic perspective 
on tax competition in capital income taxation
Taxation affects economic decisions. Consumers for example try to reduce their 
value-added tax (VAT) burden by cross-border shopping and companies seek to 
minimize their tax payments by their location decisions. If we want to assess 
how changes in taxation affect the economy as a whole, we need an economic 
yardstick for efﬁciency. 
In an international context this yardstick is usually threefold: we aim at an 
efﬁcient international specialization of national economies and an efﬁcient al-
location of capital as well as labor across countries. As we focus on effects of 
the tax system on the economy and not on possible market failures we assume, 
that national economies in a world without taxes would achieve all three. From 
this starting point we can analyze possible distorting consequences of tax com-
petition. 
International differences in taxation can distort an efﬁciently functioning 
global economy especially via four channels (see ﬁgure 1): 
-  Indirect taxation - as e.g. in form of a value-added tax (VAT) - can affect 
international commodity trade and international specialization,
-  Corporate taxation affects the location decisions of ﬁrms and therefore inter-
national specialization and international capital allocation,
-  Taxation of capital income triggers capital movements and changes the in-
ternational allocation of capital and ﬁnally
-  Labor income taxation can cause labor migration and affect the international 
allocation of labor. 
To discuss international tax competition in all these dimensions is clearly 
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we want to focus on the most important 
dimension of tax competition. What do the empirics tell us about the importance 
of different dimensions of tax competition? Is labor migration an important phe-
nomenon which is largely triggered by differences in labor income taxation? Do 
we have reason to expect strong effects of tax competition in commodity trade 
in Europe? And what about capital movements and location decisions of ﬁrms? 
Do they play an important role?
If we look at the empirics, we see that migration is - as demonstrated by 
data for some of the most important European countries - still very limited (see 
ﬁgure 2). Although immigration in Germany equals 1.08% of the population in 
2001, net migration is only 0.34% as 0.74% of the population leave the country 
per year. The numbers look similar for other large European countries. The free 
movement of labor within the European Union has so far only had very limited 
effects on migration. And more detailed analyses of migration in Europe (see e.g. 
Tassinopoulos/Werner 1998 or United Nations Population division 2002) show, 
that tax policy is not so much a concern for emi- and immigration. Therefore we 
largely abstract from labor mobility and tax competition via labor income taxa-
tion in this paper.1 
1  We abstract as well from migration triggered by differences in welfare beneﬁts, which are at 
least partly ﬁnanced by taxes. If migration of this kind becomes very prominent, basic results 
of our analysis might change. See e.g. Sinn (2003, Chapter 1). 
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If we look at the commodity markets, the importance of international trade is 
growing strongly (see ﬁgure 3). In the EU 15 for example, the ratio of exports to 
GDP (or the ratio of imports to GDP respectively) has increased from around 25% 
of GDP in 1990 to more than 37% in 2004 (including intra-European trade). 
Does tax competition have important effects on the development of trade 
especially in the EU? And is tax competition eventually partly responsible for the 
strongly increasing volume of trade? Most important in this context is value-added 
taxation (VAT). In VAT two basic international tax regimes are possible: The origin 
principle and the destination principle. While the ﬁrst taxes all goods with the VAT 
rate valid in the country of production, the second levies the VAT rate valid in the 
country where the good is ﬁnally sold to the customer. In international markets 
the origin principle induces distortions based on tax differentials: Production of 
consumption goods will move to countries with low VAT rates. The destination 
principle on the other hand largely eliminates distortions by differences in VAT 
rates and limits distortions to private cross-border shopping. 
The European Union has implemented a destination principle - which under-
lies GATT as well - and avoids thereby tax competition via indirect taxation. As we 
focus on Europe in this paper we are abstaining from a discussion of international 
tax competition in indirect taxation as well, although this is internationally not 
an unimportant dimension. 2
International investment ﬂows - as an indicator for capital mobility - incre-
ased in the last decade even stronger than trade (see ﬁgure 4). World foreign di-
rect investment inﬂows have grown by more than 500% from 1990 to 1999 and 
world foreign portfolio investment ﬂows increased almost sevenfold from 1990 
to 2000. While capital is highly mobile, taxation of capital income is far from 
being harmonized. Tax bases and tax rates differ largely across countries as well 
as principles of taxations. Some countries have implemented a source-tax - ta-
xing proﬁts and interest where they are generated - while others try to raise the 
capital income tax based on a strict residence principle within income taxation. 
Capital ﬂows can react far more easily than labor, than companies and than com-
modity trade to differences in taxation. Therefore we have to expect the strongest 
effects of tax competition with respect to the taxation of capital income (we will 
Figure 2 Figure 3
2  For a more detailed discussion see Sinn (1991). 
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use the terms „capital tax/capital taxation“ respectively). This leads us to set our 
focus on capital taxation. 
In the fourth dimension - the effects of corporate taxation on the location 
decisions of ﬁrms - we can unfortunately not dispose of international reliable 
data. But in the very simple models we will discuss in the third part of the paper, 
a shift in capital investment and a relocation of a production facility are substi-
tutes. Therefore corporate location decisions are - although only implicitly - co-
vered in the analysis of this paper. 
Analytically we chose to start with a welfare-economic approach (see ﬁgure 5) 
and assume that economic policy is implemented by a benevolent social planner, 
maximizing the overall welfare of labor and capital owners in an economy.3
We chose this approach to evaluate the strength of the welfare-economic case 
against tax competition. A public choice approach is more realistic as it would 
broaden the perspective by taking self-interested politicians into account, who 
do not necessarily always maximize social welfare. In the last part of the paper 
we will show how the inclusion of the arguments resulting from such a broader 
perspective can affect our general conclusion. 
Of course there are many aspects, which are not covered in this analysis. For 
example taxation of capital income reduces the incentives to save and therefore 
our approach to take the global capital stock being constant falls short. Labor mo-
bility - which we do not cover - might increase in the near future with important 
implications for the results derived here. We abstract from land as a production 
factor, focus on small countries unable to affect the global interest rate and look 
only at capital taxation and not at the interplay in between e.g. capital, labor and 
consumption taxes. And there are many more aspects, which are not integrated. 
On the other hand only this simpliﬁcation allows us to demonstrate the econo-
mics of international tax competition. The limits of an analysis like this should 
always be kept in mind and stimulate further research, but the only alternative 
of a simpliﬁed analysis is just to „remain in the dark“. 
Figure 4
3  We abstract from land as production factor.
Figure 5
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3. The welfare economics of the state and 
international tax competition 
In part II we have discussed an efﬁcient international economic specialization 
and an efﬁcient international allocation of capital and labor as welfare-economic 
yardsticks for the international economy. Now we broaden the perspective and 
integrate the state in the analysis. Why do we need a state? What is the optimal 
size of the state? How should the state be ﬁnanced? And how is the optimal size 
of the state and the optimal way of ﬁnancing the state affected by international 
tax competition? 
To discuss these questions we start with the economic theory of the state and 
move from there to the theory of optimal government size and taxation. Here we 
will establish the welfare-economic yardstick to analyze international tax com-
petition and tax harmonization, which we will then apply to simple models of 
capital income taxation.
3.1 The economic theory of the state
From the perspective of economic theory the justiﬁcation of the state is based on 
public good provision. Public goods, which are non-rival and non-excludable (like 
the rule of law or e.g. defense), cannot be supplied by private markets. Especially 
non-excludability sets incentives to consume these goods without contributing 
to their ﬁnancing (the so-called free-riding behavior). Only the state, which has 
the monopoly of coercion and can force its citizens to pay taxes, can secure pro-
vision of these public goods. As the provision of public goods - like for example 
the rule of law - are welfare-enhancing for the whole economy, the state has an 
economic „reason to be“. 
Based on the „power to tax“ (Buchanan and Brennan 1980), which allows for 
public good provision, a second function of the state results: the ability to redis-
tribute income. As the state has the monopoly of coercion he can decide on the 
distribution of the tax burden for public good provision and even implement a 
transfer scheme based on tax revenues. There are several arguments for a redist-
ribution of income by the state. Some focus on the maximization of overall wel-
fare, which results usually from decreasing marginal utility of income. Others see 
public income redistribution especially as an individual insurance against the risks 
of life (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). However economic theory is hardly able to 
derive an „optimal degree of income redistribution“ and is so far largely restricted 
to „procedural advice“. As economics has to contribute only comparatively little to 
the determination of the optimal level of redistribution, we abstract from these 
questions in this paper on the economics of international tax competition.4 
3.2  The theory of optimal government size and optimal taxation - Samuelson 
and Ramsey
Given that public good provision is the most important economic rational for 
the state the question of the optimal size of the state and its ﬁnancing directly 
arises. Within welfare economics especially two approaches deal with these questi-
ons, the ﬁrst looks at the expenditure side and the second at the ﬁnancing side. 
With respect to the expenditure side the Samuelson condition - derived by 
Paul Samuelson in his article „The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures“ (Samu-
elson 1954) - determines the optimal level of public good provision: the sum of 
the marginal rates of substitution between the public and the private goods of all 
citizens has to equal the transformation rate between public and private goods in 
an economy. Or to say it easier: the optimal amount of public goods is reached if 
the sum of all citizens´ marginal utilities of the public good equals the marginal 
costs of production of the public good. With respect to taxation the Samuelson 
condition assumes that the revenues of the public sector are ﬁnanced by non-
distorting taxes (e.g. head taxes). 
The assumption of non-distorting head-taxes (everybody pays the same ﬁxed 
amount of taxes independent of his income) is - in our world - largely unrealistic. 
In all modern economies taxation (e.g. of goods or production factors) changes 
relative prices. These price changes cause distortions whenever economic agents 
(consumers, households, workers, ﬁrms ...) adjust their behavior to the new relative 
prices. Compared to the world without taxes a welfare loss (called excess burden or 
dead-weight loss) results. The more elastic a tax base (that is the stronger agents 
react to changes in relative prices) the higher is the welfare loss. 
As real-world tax systems are characterized by distorting taxes, the second 
approach, the so-called theory of optimal taxation seeks (taking the revenue 
needs of the state as given) to minimize the excess burden of taxation. This shall 
be achieved by setting tax rates according to the elasticity of different tax bases 
referring to the so-called Ramsey rule (Ramsey 1927). In its simplest form the 
4  For a detailed discussion of the effects of tax competition on redistritbutive taxation see Gott-
schalk and Peters (2003).
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Ramsey rule demands that the more elastic the tax base, the lower the tax rate 
should be. 
So far we have no well-established theory in welfare economics, which inte-
grates the revenue and the expenditure side of the theory of the state satisfactory 
and therefore we have to assess the impact of the two approaches on the theory 
of international tax competition separately. 
3.3  Application of the theory of optimal government size and optimal taxation 
to international tax competition 
While the optimal size of the public sector can in theory be determined by the 
Samuelson condition, this is hardly possible in practice. Information about mar-
ginal utilities of public goods is private and individuals have an incentive to act 
strategically and lie about their preferences. Those who are in favor of very large 
amounts of a public good for example have an incentive to overstate their pre-
ference for this good as they would proﬁt from an additional unit of the good 
but would not have to bear the full costs. Therefore the Samuelson condition is 
so far of little help. 
The Ramsey-rule on the other hand has clear implications for the optimal tax 
system and clear predictions for a world with international tax competition: If 
capital is more mobile than labor, it should be taxed less. And completely inter-
nationally mobile capital should not be taxed nationally at all. 
However these prescriptions of the Ramsey-rule suffer from their exclusive 
focus on the ﬁnancing side. Most importantly they neglect the fact that capital 
proﬁts from publicly provided goods. As we will see in part 3 this can have impor-
tant implications for the optimal capital tax under tax competition. 
To avoid the problems of the Ramsey-rule welfare-economic theory therefore 
seeks to determine, whether capital taxation can under tax competition still cover 
the costs caused by capital itself (e.g. by using public infrastructure).5 If this is not 
the case we might ﬁnd negative effects of tax competition on social welfare.
3.4 Types of capital taxation - source- or residence based taxation 
Capital taxation can take place by taxation of company proﬁts and interest pa-
yments at the source and/or by taxation of residents´ capital income. 
Under the source principle tax competition has a direct effect on the interna-
tional economy. All other things equal a reduction of capital taxes by one country 
leads to capital inﬂows, while an increase leads to capital outﬂows. 
The residence principle on the other hand reduces the impact of tax compe-
tition. Independent of the capital investment location, the capital owner always 
has to pay taxes on his capital income in his country of residence. As long as resi-
dents are not mobile at all they cannot avoid paying a tax on capital income and 
even internationally differing tax rates would have no effect on the international 
capital allocation.6 
As the residence principle allows the state - at least in theory - to extract 
taxes from capital income without creating distortions it is very popular and im-
plemented in many countries like Germany or the US. But to think that the resi-
dence principle works as assumed in theory is not so realistic. First, even under 
immobility of the citizens, the residence principle works only if really all income 
from capital is reported and taxed. And this is not the case. Some studies estima-
ted the ratio of private interest income that is not reported to be as high as 40% 
in some European countries.7 And second it is naive to assume that especially the 
residents with a very high income from capital investments are not mobile. Many 
popular examples show that especially in the high-income classes mobility has 
to be taken as given. 
As mobility of owners of large capital endowments is very frequently observed 
and taxation of a large part of capital income is evaded it makes sense to focus on 
the effects of a capital taxation based on the source principle within the simple 
models of capital taxation, which will follow.8 
5  [0]see e.g. Sinn (2003, chapter 2).
6  We abstract here from the possible negative effects of capital income taxation on savings and 
the future capital stock.
7  See Genschel (2001, P. 15) for some evidence on tax evasion in residents´ capital income taxa-
tion. 
8  See for a further discussion of source- versus residence based taxation Vogel (1988). 
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4. Application of welfare-economic theory 
to capital income taxation9
4.1  Simple models of competition in international capital taxation 
We start with the simplest case: a tax on capital income is levied in a small coun-
try in form of a source tax. We take the global interest rate as given (completely 
elastic supply of capital) as changes in one small country in the world economy 
will not affect the equilibrium of the global capital market. Production of our 
small economy is modeled by a very simple production function, where we assu-
me the input of labor to be constant. Furthermore the marginal return to capital 
is decreasing: with an increasing capital stock K, the marginal return to capital 
is reduced. 
We see the capital market in our small economy in ﬁgure 6. Companies will 
expand their demand for capital as long as the marginal productivity of capital 
(reﬂected by the demand curve of capital) equals the marginal costs of capital 
(the interest rate r). This leads the market to choose a capital stock of K*. The rent 
of capital equals r times K* and the rent to labor equals the triangle in between 
demand and supply of capital from 0 to K*. At K* the sum of the rents of the two 
production factors, labor and capital, are maximized. 
Based on this very simple graph we can directly study the effects of the intro-
duction of a tax on capital income (in this case interest income) on the economy 
and the rents to labor and capital (see ﬁgure 7). 
A proportional tax on interest will just shift the national interest rate in our 
small economy upwards by the tax rate. This higher interest rate leads to a reduc-
tion of the capital stock from K* to Knew as the demand of the companies for capital 
is smaller at the higher price for capital. Most interesting is the effect on factor 
rents. We see in the graph that the absolute rent to capital decreased to r times 
Knew. But the rent per unit capital stays constant and equals r. The tax revenue - of 
t times Knew - is completely shifted to labor rent which is reduced absolutely and 
per unit as labor supply is constant. And the excess burden, which results from 
the distorting effect of the capital tax reducing the capital stock in our country, is 
borne as well completely by the factor labor. In this most simple setting we would 
9  An excellent, non-technical overview is given in Wilson (1999). A very comprehensive treatment 
can be found in Hauﬂer (2001). Tanzi (1995) discusses especially the effects of increasing capital 
mobility on taxation. 
Figure 6
Figure 7
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therefore have to conclude, that a small country, which is competing with other 
countries for mobile capital, should not tax capital income as the overall welfare 
and the welfare of the owners of the factor labor would be reduced.10 
4.2  Tax competition models with capital proﬁting from publicly provided 
goods
One could argue that the model discussed in the previous section is overly simpli-
ﬁed as capital investment proﬁts directly from publicly provided goods. Companies 
rely on public infrastructure, can make use of the legal system and are protected 
by the police force. Do these effects change our basic results? And how can these 
effects be integrated in our simple model? 
The ﬁrst possibility would be that the goods, which are publicly provided, are 
pure public goods. In this case the marginal costs for using these public goods 
would be zero and consequently there should be no price for using these goods. 
And there would be no costs directly attributable to the employment of capital 
as everybody would be able to consume the non-rival public good. Therefore the 
provision of these goods would not directly justify a tax on capital. 
But modern states do not only provide pure public goods but private goods or 
impure public goods as well. If a private good were publicly provided we would 
expect constant costs per unit capital employed. If we double the amount of ca-
pital employed, the costs for publicly providing a private good would double as 
well. In case of impure public goods - like most of the municipal infrastructure 
used by companies - we would assume positive economies of scale: if we double 
the amount of capital employed, the total costs for providing these goods would 
increase, but by less than 100%. In this case we would observe decreasing mar-
ginal costs for the publicly provided good (meaning that provision of the good 
gets cheaper per unit with an increasing amount of the good). We could choose 
municipal infrastructure as an example as it would not be a perfect public good 
because it is at least partly rival (because of possible congestion) and at least partly 
excludable (in case of roads for example by introduction of a toll system).
How would the existence of costs directly attributable to capital change our 
simple model?
First we analyze public provision of a private good, which is used by capital 
employed. This case is illustrated in ﬁgure 8. If we have constant costs per unit 
capital employed for a publicly provided good, then we observe that the capital 
stock K* is no longer optimal. At K* the total marginal costs of capital - resulting 
from the interest rate and the marginal costs for the publicly provided private 
good - would exceed the marginal revenue of capital. Resulting is an excess bur-
den (dead weight loss), which reduces the rent to the factor labor. If now a tax 
on capital income equaling the marginal costs of the publicly provided good is 
introduced, the capital stock is reduced to Knew. In this new situation the costs 
for the publicly provided good are borne completely by capital and no longer by 
the factor labor. And the rent of the factor labor increases as the dead weight loss 
is no longer there. So we can conclude that the public provision of private goods 
would justify a tax on capital, which would be welfare-enhancing. In this case 
such a tax would not be affected by tax competition, as no country would have 
an incentive to reduce the tax rate below the level of marginal costs. 
10  For a more detailed discussion see MacDougall (1960). Figure 8
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Figure 9
While cases of public provision of private goods should be relatively rare, 
the case of publicly provided goods with decreasing marginal costs should be 
very prevalent as these goods cannot be provided by companies in competitive 
markets: On a competitive market the price would equal marginal costs and as 
average costs would be above marginal costs all companies would make losses.11 
This second case is illustrated in ﬁgure 10. Here again total welfare is maximi-
zed where total marginal costs (rent and marginal costs for the publicly provided 
good) equal marginal return to capital. 
As in the previous example we see that welfare-economic theory would speak 
in favor of a tax on capital income equaling the marginal costs of publicly provi-
ded infrastructure. An introduction of such a tax would lead to the point Knew. 
This tax would make capital pay at least partly for the publicly provided good 
and result in an additional welfare gain for the factor labor (the light gray tri-
angle). But - in contrast to the previous case - capital still does not bear the full 
infrastructure costs it causes. The dark-gray triangle represents the costs caused 
by capital which are not covered by the tax revenues of an optimal tax on capi-
tal income and therefore have to be borne by labor. How large this transfer from 
labor to capital is, depends on the cost structure. If we take into account that 
especially the richer classes can rely on capital income while the poorer classes 
dispose only of labor income, this transfer tends to redistribute from poor to rich. 
And if the transfer of labor to capital is large this might even make redistribution 
in form of a modern welfare state impossible as total tax revenues will no longer 
be sufﬁciently high. 
From these examples we learn, that the public costs caused by capital em-
ployment are crucial for the welfare-economic evaluation of the consequences 
of international tax competition. If capital employment causes costs increasing 
with the amount of capital employed, a tax on capital is optimal. But in the most 
realistic case of positive economies of scale (decreasing marginal costs) even the 
optimal tax would not prevent a redistribution from poor to rich as the state will 
not be able to raise sufﬁcient tax revenue which could cover the costs caused by 
capital. As we have argued in section 3.3 tax competition in capital income ta-
xation can in this case have harmful effects. 
4.3  Tax harmonization - a superior alternative? 
The alternative to international tax competition is international tax harmonization. 
In the most extreme case tax bases and tax rates are completely equalized in two 
countries. What about the welfare-economic effects in this setting?
The literature of tax harmonization usually demonstrates the effects of tax 
harmonization in a two-country (country A and B) model and a given capital 
stock. To connect our analysis to the previous parts we assume that the emp-
loyment of capital causes infrastructure costs, which are marginally decreasing 
(analogous to 3.6). 
Although capital income taxation is completely harmonized countries still de-
cide autonomously on public investment in goods attracting capital - like business 
infrastructure. When setting the optimal level of public investment each coun-
try takes only its own welfare into account. But in case of tax harmonization an 
external effect occurs: an increase in public investment in land A increases the 
capital stock in A but reduces - all other things equal - the capital stock in land 
B and vice versa. As this external effect is not internalized, countries with har-11  For a more detailed discussion see Sinn (2003, p. 47 ff).
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monized tax systems overprovide public goods. Therefore tax harmonization does 
not provide us with a generally superior alternative to tax competition.12 
4.4 Policy implications of welfare-economic theory 
Tax competition - as we have demonstrated in section 4.2 - can have harmful 
consequences. In a realistic case of decreasing marginal costs of publicly provi-
ded goods used by capital, even optimal capital taxation fails to cover the costs 
caused by capital employed in an economy. As a consequence this can cause re-
distribution from the poor to the rich and create pressure on the welfare-state. 
How important these effects are will depend on the cost structure of publicly 
provided goods and the production function. 
But the alternative - tax harmonization e.g. within Europe - does not neces-
sarily perform better in welfare-economic analysis. As we discussed in 4.3 tax 
harmonization with national decisions on public good provision does not abolish 
competition completely but replaces tax competition just by expenditure compe-
tition. And this competition does not necessarily lead to an optimal level of public 
goods, but might well result in an overprovision of public goods. 
In effect there is no clear policy advice from welfare economics: just based on 
welfare-economic theory we are unable to decide whether the possible distorti-
ons by tax competition or those by tax harmonization are more important. Some 
insights on this can be derived by recent game-theoretic studies trying to analyze 
whether the proposed negative effects of tax competition or tax harmonization 
are more important. One example it the study by Mendoza and Tesar (2003) which 
predicts for Europe higher welfare levels under tax competition.13
5. What do the empirics say?
As we have shown in part 2 there is an indication that capital mobility has incre-
ased dramatically within the last years. Based on the general welfare-economic 
theory following the Ramsey-Rule (to decrease the tax rates and the tax burden 
when elasticity of a tax base is increasing) we should expect to see the tax bur-
den of capital to decrease disproportional (compared to the tax burden of e.g. 
labor and consumption). The logic we applied in the models of capital taxation 
with infrastructure causing marginally decreasing costs leads to similar empirical 
predictions: while it might have been possible to tax capital income heavily under 
the absence of capital mobility, mobile capital will lead to a decrease in capital 
income taxation and an increase in labor income taxation, as capital taxation 
might not be able to cover the costs caused by capital employment.14 
So we have relatively clear predictions of what we should see in international 
data on taxation. To test these predictions we can take a look at the development 
of tax burdens measured by effective tax rates (taking tax revenues and factor 
income from national accounts data) in the OECD (see ﬁgure 10). While capital 
mobility has increased heavily within 1965 to 1995 we do not see decreasing but 
increasing effective tax rates on capital - nearly as strong as the increase of labor 
taxation. Although one could argue that the proportional tax revenues of capital 
income are decreasing slower than the revenues of labor income and that the 
share of labor income taxes, this can hardly be seen as evidence for the welfare-
economic predictions as the total burden of capital is increasing. 
Although a quick look at effective tax rates obviously does not replace an 
thoroughly empirical analysis, we ﬁnd similar results in other empirical studies: 
The effects of tax competition - predicted by welfare economic theory - like a 
„race to the bottom“ in capital taxation and consequently problems to ﬁnance 
the public infrastructure or large and increasing transfers from labor income to 
support expenses for capital infrastructure are not observable in recent data.15 So 
far there is little evidence for harmful effects of tax competition.
12  The effects of tax harmonization are discussed very controversially in the literature. While 
Sinn (2003, p. 52 ff) expects overprovision of public goods in case of expenditure competition 
other models like King, McAfee and Welling (1993) come to the conclusion that even under 
expenditure competition an optimal level of public good provision can be reached. 
13  The economics of tax competition versus tax competition in Europe are discussed in more detail 
especially in Oates (2001), Cnossen (2003) Sinn (1991, 2002 and 2003) and Zodrow (2003). 
14  One could argue that the costs for infrastructure investments for capital employment have risen 
dramatically within the last decades and that therefore even a constant or an increasing tax 
burden on capital would still not contradict the theoretical prediction. However so far there have 
been no arguments presented way this should be the case not to speak of empirical studies. 
15  See for example the discussion in Genschel (2001) or in Hauﬂer (2001).
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While welfare-economic models of tax competition had relatively clear em-
pirical predictions, the effect of tax competition on the optimal size of the public 
sector is harder to measure. As we have argued before the theoretical yardstick 
for the optimal size of the public sector in a state - the Samuelson condition - is 
hardly applicable in practice. If we take GDP as an indicator for social welfare - 
which shall be maximized by the Samuelson condition as well - then one possible 
approach would be to analyze the effects of changes of the size of government 
on economic growth. Negative effects of an increasing public sector on economic 
growth can be seen as an indication that the public sector is already too large 
(compared to its optimal size), while positive effects would indicate that we are 
still in a situation where public goods are underprovided. A recent study by Vito 
Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht (2003) analyses this relationship (see ﬁgure 11). 
The results of this and other studies16 support the view, that the public sec-
tor is already too large in most OECD countries: growth of the government sec-
tor has had negative effects on economic growth within 1960-2000. Taking this 
as given, the further overprovision of public goods, which would result from tax 
harmonization, currently seems to be more harmful than some pressure to reduce 
tax burdens by tax competition. 
6. Public choice considerations and conclusion 
Welfare economics do not show that tax harmonization is generally preferable 
to tax competition. Instead we learn that distortions have to be expected under 
tax competition (e.g. in form of some redistribution from poor to rich) as well as 
under tax harmonization (in form of overprovision of public goods like infrastruc-
ture). These results have been derived under the very optimistic assumption that 
policies are implemented by a benevolent social planner. 
Figure 10
Figure 11
16  See Alfonso et. al. (2005) P. 23 for an overview and further references. 
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Western European democratic systems however are not governed by „benevo-
lent social planners“ but allow self-interested politicians to extract various rents 
for themselves and give out favors to special interest groups causing economic 
inefﬁciencies. 
Therefore we have to broaden our perspective to address the effects of tax 
competition realistically. If we integrate inefﬁciencies in the political system, the 
threat of capital to leave a country (which is made credible based on capital mo-
bility and tax competition) 
– restricts a „Leviathan-state“ in exploiting its citizens excessively (Buchanan 
and Brennan 1960),
– strengthens incentives to reduce inefﬁciencies in the public sector and to search 
for innovative approaches to make the state „serve its citizens better“ (adjust 
the tax and expenditure system better to local preferences) and 
– reduces the ability of politicians to extract rents.17 
Therefore public choice arguments promote tax competition almost unani-
mously, while negative effects have to be expected from tax harmonization. 
A broader perspective - integrating public choice and welfare-economic con-
siderations and results of applied empirical research - speaks therefore in our view 
clearly in favor of tax competition. 
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